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Abstract: The paper presents a Special Protection Scheme solution for the central Zagreb transmission 
system. The Central Zagreb transmission system is characterized by a highly meshed network with combined 
overhead and cable sections and a special operation of the 110 kV cable link between two power plants 
important for the city’s heat and electricity supply. The Special Protection Scheme is developed using static 
and dynamic analyses of different network scenarios. Island operation is simulated for a consumption and 
generation surplus, and an underfrequency load shedding scheme is determined. The Special Protection 
Scheme architecture is presented with a brief description of the telecommunication infrastructure. 
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Residential areas, especially centers of the large 
cities, are characterized by highly meshed networks, 
both transmission and distribution. Government 
buildings and offices, business blocks, shopping 
malls, etc. lead to a dense concentration of people 
and, consequently, high electricity consumption. 
Additionally, both transmission and distribution 
networks are combined, consisting of overhead lines 
and underground cables, which leads to more 
complicated operating schemes in order to provide a 
stable and secure electrical energy supply. Power 
plants that are located in residential areas often 
provide heating energy besides electricity, which 
gives even more importance to its stable operation. 
In the central Zagreb area operating schemes are 
even more complicated by the fact that an important 
underground transmission cable loop, connecting 
the most important 110 kV substations and two 
power plants located in the city center, has to be 
split because of two reasons: the first is an inability 
to control power flows through the residential 
transmission network, and the other is the influence 
of the closed loop on the short circuit current level 
in that part of the network. The consequence is a 
radial operation of the major supplying 110 kV 
substation at one end of the opened loop, and a 
radial operation of the 100 MW power plant with 
supplying 110 kV substation at the other end. 
The two mentioned power plants have a total rated 
electrical power of 550 MW and total rated heating 
power of 1000 MWh. Because of their location, 
both power plants are ideal for black start and island 
operation ancillary services provision. That way, in 
case of severe system disturbances important 
customers would be supplied with electrical energy, 
and system restoration would be improved. 
The main goal of the Special Protection Scheme 
(SPS), proposed in the paper, is to improve the 
reliability of the electrical energy supply in the 
central Zagreb area. This can be achieved by solving 
two main issues: 
1) Closing of the 110 kV transmission loop to 
improve service reliability in the city central 
area by monitoring and mitigating potential 
overloading issues, 
2) Configuring and maintaining service for the 
central Zagreb grid during major outside 
system disturbances by the following automatic 
procedure: 
a. Detecting critical disturbances with security 
against misoperation, 
b. Forming an operating island, 
c. Balancing island load and local generation. 
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The objective is to construct a SPS based on 
anticipated functional requirements developed 
through system studies and through industry 
experience with SPSs.  The multifunctional system 
requires a flexible and general architecture based on 
centralized control and data communications.  The 
SPS must have the flexibility to be programmed 
with a range of specific algorithms that might be 
created as study and development continues.  Power 
system operating specifics impact specific SPS 
calculations and algorithms, but the overall SPS is 
to have a common and consistent design that can be 
modified and expanded as needed. 
 
2. SYSTEM OPERATION OVERVIEW  
 
2.1. Transmission system overview 
 
The central Zagreb 110 kV transmission network is 
presented in Fig. 1. The area of interest for the 
implementation of SPS is bordered with a blue line. 
The area comprises two power plants, named ELTO 
and TETO, and five 110 kV substations. There are 
two connections that are out of operation in the 
usual operating regimes, marked in the scheme with 
dashed lines and red crosses. The described 
operation is a countermeasure against a high short 
circuit current level that exceeds the circuit breaker 
rated current in several 110 kV substations. The 
direct consequence of such an operation is an 
opened cable loop between the ELTO and TETO 
power plants and an opened connection between the 
eastern and western part of the Zagreb transmission 
network, due to the split busbars in the TETO power 
plant. 
The network complexity is additionally burdened 
with different ownership of the facilities. Power 
plants, together with associated 110 kV substations, 
are under the ownership of the power production 
company (PPC). The two 110 kV substations and 
corresponding transmission lines belong to the 
distribution system operator (DSO), while three 110 
kV substations and corresponding transmission lines 
belong to the system operator (TSO). The ownership 
is indicated in Figure 1. Additionally, lower voltage 
sides of all seven 110 kV substations belong to the 
DSO. These facts are also important in the creation 
of the SPS because of the responsibility and 
controlling ability of the different actors over 
different parts of the network and facilities. Power 
system defense strategy, including load shedding 
and island operation schemes, is a task of the TSO, 
but implementation and execution is also a task of 
the DSO and the PPC. 
 
 
Figure 1. Central Zagreb 110 kV transmission 
system 
 
The combined heat and power (CHP) power plant 
TETO is comprised of 6 generating units, three with 
gas turbines and three with a classic steam turbine. 
The total electrical power is rated at 450 MW. 
Distribution load from the plant substation is up to 
65 MW. The CHP power plant ELTO consists of 
two steam units, 32 MW and 12 MW (G1 and G2), 
and two gas units, 25 MW each (G3 and G4). The 
distribution load from the plant substation is up to 
63 MW. The maximum load of the central Zagreb 
area is roughly 500 MW. 
 
2.2. Split busbar and opened cable loop operating 
conditions 
 
The split busbars at TETO normally operate with 
the tie breaker open to split the station.  The system 
operator assigns specific TETO generating units to 
the east or west part of the busbars, according to the 
situation in the network, to avoid fault current duties 
beyond the ratings of circuit breakers and to control 
the power flows. The 110 kV cable from ELTO to 
TETO is normally kept open as shown in Figure 1.  
Opening the loop avoids unpredictable power flows 
caused by the relatively low cable impedances 
compared to the surrounding overhead network. The 
cable load rating for each of these loop cable paths 
is 140 MVA.  The opened transmission path thus 
exposes critical central Zagreb loads to outages from 
a single transmission failure contingency.  The first 
objective of the proposed SPS is to support the safe 
operation of the system with the transmission cable 
in service to close the loop and increase reliability.  
The SPS manages loading issues that can arise due 
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to certain configurations of TETO generation 
combined with other transmission outages. 
Studies described in Sections 3 show that, for most 
operating circumstances that are consistent with 
islanding preparedness, the cable paths should not 
be overloaded.  Furthermore, opening the 
overloaded cable only (which an overload relay on 
the cable would do) may protect the cable but is not 
the optimum action for overall system operating 
integrity.  Therefore, managing the cable loading by 
other actions such as generator dispatch before 
protective relays trip the cable on overload is a task 
for the SPS. 
 
2.3. Islanding operation 
 
In the case of a major outage of the Croatian 
national grid or beyond, the restoration strategy is to 
keep the central Zagreb network operating with 
local generation at TETO and ELTO.  The task of 
an islanding implementation in the proposed SPS is 
to accomplish the following: 
a) Detecting the external emergency for which 
islanding is required. Measurements can include: 
• Load flow patterns. 
• Frequency or change of frequency at specific 
locations. 
• Bus voltage magnitude relationships (require 
information gathered from phasor measurement 
units (PMU)). 
• Bus voltage angular relationships across the 
area.   
• Trigger from a specific contingency identified 
in planning studies, such as loss of a critical 
400 kV line external to the central loop area. 
The detection algorithm may include multiple-factor 
authentication of the emergency for high security – 
it is critical to avoid islanding and associated load 
shedding for transient recoverable system 
disturbances. Once a system emergency is detected, 
the task of the SPS is to form an island with the best 
achievable balance of load and generation—with 
small excess load, some of which is then shed to 
achieve a load-generation balance; or with some 
excess generation which is reduced by governors.   
b) Forming an island  
The island comprises the system section presented 
on Figure 2. If the network topology is standard, 
then opening of 4 ties secures the island. If the 
busbars at TETO power plant are not split, opening 
of three lines tied to the east bus secures the island. 
There are several islanding possibilities, depending 
on the network state. As the SPS secures the island, 
the strategy is to close the bus tie between the split 
TETO buses and obtain all TETO generation for the 
island, while immediately disconnecting ties to the 
east. Formation of islands requires generation and 
load tracking, balancing calculations, transmission 
loading calculations, load shedding, and restoration 
support. While the island operation lasts, the task of 
the SPS is to constantly balance the island by 
managing the load, together with generating units’ 
governors action.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Central Zagreb islanding area 
 
3. SYSTEM ANALYSES 
 
3.1. Static analysis 
 
The power flow and short circuit calculations were 
carried out in order to determine the SPS concept 
solution. The power flow calculations of the normal 
integrated city network operation, with the 110 kV 
cable TETO-Trpimirova both in operation and 
outaged, then various TETO and ELTO generation 
outputs, as well as examples of the lines congestions 
(criterion N-1 and N-2) were carried out. Different 
cases of the generation arrangement for two island 
operation configurations were analyzed (the radial 
configuration connected with the north cables and 
the proposed loop configuration, which includes the 
south overhead lines and substations). The gained 
results are important for understanding the impact of 
the issued congestions. 
The power flow calculations include examples with 
the N-1 criterion which could affect the generators 
arrangement in ELTO, as well as connection of the 
generators in TETO on the east or west busbar. In 
some of the analyzed cases, configuration of the 
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generators in combination with the cables outages 
(criterion N-1 or N-2) leads to the predicted 
overloads. The control of these overloads could be 
based on an on-line security analysis and the 
appropriate configuration, set by operators. The SPS 
will be programmed to control the overloads and 
shedding and/or to rearrange the generators in the 
case when the cable outage could cause an overload 
with the sufficient generation during the disturbance 
conditions. Figure 3. gives the power flow 
calculation results for the possible closed loop 
scenario. It was assumed that the parallel lines that 
connect Jarun and Botinec were outaged due to an 
overload. As a result, the cable 110 kV TETO-
Trpimirova gets overloaded. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Power flow calculation results for the 
possible closed loop scenario 
 
3.2. Stability analysis 
 
Stability analyses were carried out in order to 
determine the behaviour of the generation units 
during major system faults, including the island 
operation of an ELTO power plant on local 
residential consumption. The following network 
scenarios were simulated and analysed: 
a. Determination of ELTO generating units 
critical fault duration for  a nearby  three-
phase fault, 
b. Island operation of ELTO generating units G3 
and G4, with consumption surplus, 
c. Island operation of ELTO generating units G3 
and G4, with generation surplus. 
A detailed model of a local network was established 
for stability analysis purposes, Figure 4. 
ELTO generating units critical fault duration time 
was determined on the basis of a three-phase short-
circuit on 110 kV busbars in substation Jarun. The 
calculated critical fault duration time for all four 
units is presented in Table 1 
 
Figure 4.  A detailed model of local network  
 
Table 1. ELTO  units critical fault duration time 
ELTO generating units Critical fault duration time (ms) 
G1, G2 295 
G3, G4 254 
 
An angle response of units G1 and G3 due to a 
three-phase short-circuit fault on 110 kV busbars in 
substation Jarun, with a duration of Tcr = 160 ms 
(60ms is the time of circuit breaker activation) is 
presented in Figure 5.  
Island operation of ELTO generating units G3 and 
G4 with consumption surplus was simulated in the 
following way: after a three-phase short-circuit on 
the 110 kV line Jarun – ELTO, with the duration of 
160 ms, the fault was cleared by tripping the line. 
The 30 kV cables between Jarun and ELTO were 




















Figure 5. Angle response of units G1 and G3, 
three-phase short-circuit fault on 110 kV 
busbars in SS Jarun, Tcr = 160 ms 
After line tripping, an island was established, with 
46 MW of generation (units G3 and G4) and 74 
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MW of consumption, including the load in SS 
Trpimirova that has been connected to the ELTO 
and disconnected from TETO in this scenario. The 
generating unit G1, with pre-fault production of 18 
MW, was automatically disconnected from the 
network after islanding due to the inability to work 
in island operation. After a sudden drop in 
frequency, the underfrequency load-shedding relays 
were activated. The load was shedded in three steps.  
The underfrequency load shedding scheme, 
designed to support SPS implementation, is given in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Underfrequency load shedding scheme 
Underfrequency 
real step 
I step      
f=49,2 Hz   
(MW) 
II step      
f=48,8 Hz   
(MW) 
III step      
f=48,4 Hz     
(MW) 
IV step      
f=48,0 Hz   
(MW) 
Percentage of 
the total load  10 15 15 15 
 
 
After load-shedding, a balance was reached, with a 
slight generation surplus. The electrical power 
production response of units G3 and G4 is shown in 
Figure 6, while the system and sub-system 















Figure 6. Electrical power production response of 
units G3 and G4, an islanding   scenario 















Figure 7. System and sub-system frequency 
response, an islanding scenario with 
consumption surplus  
 
Island operation of ELTO generating units G3 and 
G4 with generation surplus was simulated in the 
same way as in the previously described scenario. 
After line tripping of the 110 kV line Jarun – ELTO, 
an island was established with 46 MW of generation 
(units G3 and G4) and 32 MW of consumption. The 
generating unit G1 was automatically disconnected 
from the network after islanding. After a sudden 
increase of frequency, gas unit turbine governors 
reduced the output power in order to decrease the 
frequency. The electrical power production response 
of units G3 and G4 is shown on Figure 8, while the 
system and sub-system frequency response is given 
















Figure 8. Electrical power production response of 
units G3 and G4, an islanding scenario   
















Figure 9. System and sub-system frequency 
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4. SPS ARHITECTURE 
 
Since the SPS is expected to perform mission 
critical functions in spite of equipment maintenance 
or failures, it has to be realized in a dual redundant 
configuration. The objective of dual redundancy is 
for the SPS to continue to perform its required 
functions, with no significant degradation of 
performance and no loss of data, following the 
failure of any single SPS component (central 
controller, relay, or communication circuit). For 
some components, such as controllers or 
communications networking connections within a 
facility, additional redundancy may be designed into 
each of the two SPS systems. For example, the 
central controllers in each of the separate systems 
are sometimes configured as dual redundant or triple 
redundant to achieve availability and security 
approaching that of the protective relays in the 
substations. 
The dual redundant system should include the 
following major components, Figure 10:  
• Dual redundant monitoring relays, System A 
and System B, at each substation in the SPS 
plan. These relays supply real-time information 
about transmission system flows, breaker states 
and operations, and contingencies (fault 
protection relay operations). Where a large 
number of values are to be gathered, multiple 
relays may be required for each of System A 
and System B. 
• Dual redundant programmable central 
controllers that process information received 
from the SPS line monitoring relays to 
determine if any mitigating control actions are 
needed—System A and System B. Each central 
controller will be designed to handle the SPS 
analytics, data historian, external system 
interfaces, and input conditioning completely 
independent of the other controller.  
• Dual-redundant mitigation relays—System A 
relays and System B relays, that execute the 
control actions requested by the SPS central 
controllers at substations in the SPS plan.  
These can be the same relays that perform the 
monitoring.  
• Redundant communication links that carry the 
measurements, status indications, and control 
commands between the SPS substations and the 




Figure 10. Secure communications architecture 
 
The SPS communication network has to support a 
wide ETHERNET area (WAN) that will transmit 
Layer 2 multicast IEC61850 GOOSE messages for 
high speed measurement and control,  and a third 
level IP-based network with data for system 
monitoring and control.  
The network will be completely redundant and 
diversified, with two separate paths from each 
substation to the TSO control centre, without a 
single point of failure that could negatively 
influence the multiple redundant components or 
paths. The realization of all SPS components has to 
be constantly monitored and failure has to be 
alarmed. The system has to be immune to 
“broadcast storms” and malfunctions that are not 
alarmed, like controller blockade in code loop. All 





A solution for the Special Protection Scheme of the 
Transmission System of central Zagreb is presented 
in the paper. The solution provides more flexible 
operation of a transmission network, and automatic 
electrical island forming in the case of severe 
system disturbance. SPS architecture is described, 
together with communication network specification. 
Further system studies have to be focused on 
network-wide planning scenarios, to identify any 
specific vulnerability outside the central loop that 
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